Preferences are at the root of our reasoning. Without preference, there isn’t reason. Action becomes commensurate with inaction. From any variety of preferences, a decision tree is grown. From this tree an incalculable number of possibilities are pruned by competing preferences until only a branch is remaining. This is a process that is executed in fleeting moments. It’s rare that it’s carried out from intellectual reflection and deliberation. And this is a sin given a preference’s ability to transmute our every action.
I prefer calorific, tasty foods to bland but healthy foods. I prefer being healthy to being unhealthy. I have competing preferences. My array of choices are unknowingly narrowed by these two preferences when presented with a decision. I eat the cake and fulfill one preference or I don’t and fulfill another. Which preference decides my action? The preference with the highest priority as measured by some opaque working of my brain. Yesterday, I saw that I was overweight. I don’t want to be overweight. My preference for being healthy gains priority. I haven’t eaten any unhealthy foods in a while, and I prefer novelty in my life. My preference for calorific, tasty foods gains priority. In ignorance of my reasoning, I accept cake when offered. With a tinge of reluctance I feel the competing preference.
Philosophers construct an artificial preference system and then excise the brain’s preference system for all moral decisions. Next they stitch together the artificial with the natural in an attempt to remain coherent. But this fails. The artificial preference system doesn’t account our true preferences. I wouldn’t weight a thousand strangers’ worth at a even a fraction of a family member’s. I wouldn’t accept another’s preference for one virtue over another in isolation of my own. I wouldn’t accept a rule that conflicts with my own. Additionally, I wouldn’t accept an approximate system for judging moral statements. A philosopher concludes utilitarianism is incoherent for a level of decisions below those concerning society and groups. The philosopher doesn’t see utilitarianism is incoherent, but instead sees it as being useful for a class of decisions. The philosopher uses virtual ethics for decisions involving their family, and utilitarianism for their employees.
I see the brain’s preference system as encompassing utilitarianism and virtue ethics. I have a preference to see the flourishing of the many over the few. I have preference to see the flourishing of my family over the many. My preference for my family greatly outweighs the other. This is consistency. This is functional. It accounts for every situation and is self improving upon accumulation of knowledge.
This is the goal: understand and inform your preferences to the significance of the potential decisions derived from them. I have a varying preference for pork. I’m indifferent – I have no preference – towards a pig’s flourishing. I’m confronted with a thought. I’m taken into a field with a bound and thrashing pig. I see the pig set afire while alive. I see suffering, and I prefer to not see suffering. I now have a preference to see pigs flourish to a degree. I no longer eat pork unless I can confidently assume it’s been treated well. I discover that pigs are one of the more intelligent species — more intelligent than dogs. I see they’re capable of recognizing red paint on their bodies when looking into a mirror — this indicates self-awareness. I see their suffering as faintly comparable to my own. My preference for seeing pigs flourish increases in priority. I no longer eat pork.
A person brutally murders an innocent child. Was this wrong? This person has anti-social personality disorder (ASPD). They have no preference to see the flourishing of others. No, from their view they haven’t done anything wrong. They’ve acted in accordance with their preferences. From my view, they have. Am I right? Capgras delusion is a neurological disorder in which the connection between the visual system and the emotional system is severed. When a person with this disorder sees a family member, they feel no emotion for them. This is very unusual, and are consequently suspicious. They see family members as being impostors. Are they right? From their view, probably. That is, until they’re told they have a disorder with a distinct physiological cause. They now know their judgement is suspect for all decisions reliant on their visual system being connected with their emotional system. We know people with Capras delusion are wrong as we know people with ASPD are wrong.
I’m an argument. I think it’s good to push a fat man off a bridge to save five peoples’ lives. The person I’m in argument with – Jill – thinks otherwise. Am I right? Jill has a preference for seeing people flourish and a stronger preference to never kill. I have a weaker preference to never kill. One of us has prioritized our preferences incorrectly as shown by Aumann’s agreement theorem. For instance, we might find that Jill has a strong preference
Talk about what a preference is and why it’s important
- Talk about how preferences are used in decisions
- Talk about what a preference has to do with metaethicals and normative ethics — our preference system encompasses our ethical systems
The Concrete Abstract 